Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 1:03 am
Time: 1:03 am
Results for domestic terrorism
21 results foundAuthor: Brister, Paul D. Title: Ku Klux Rising: Toward an Understanding of American Right Wing Terrorist Campaigns Summary: Since 1866, the Ku Klux Klan has been able to muster three distinctive and sustained campaigns of terrorism, commonly referred to as the three “waves” of Klan violence. The first occurred between 1866 and 1871, the second between 1915 and 1928, and the third from roughly 1954 to the mid-1960s. Subsequent to the third wave, the Klan unsuccessfully attempted another resurgence in the mid-1970s/early 1980s but was snuffed out before a campaign could be triggered. By studying the three most successful Klan campaigns of the past (granting that each varied in scope, intensity and outcome) alongside the failed campaign attempt of the 1970–1980s, this dissertation will investigate which commonly cited factors and conditions were, in fact, associated with the rise of the KKK’s campaigns of terrorism. Ultimately, the dissertation finds that four factors—the presence of a safe haven, organizational structure, leadership, and recruitment techniques—are necessary and jointly sufficient to explain Klan campaign emergence. By combining these factors in a manner which better reflects their interplay, a model offering greater explanatory value emerges. The first significant set of correlates is the presence or absence of safe havens and their relation to the organizational structure chosen by Klan leadership. The second set of correlates is the ability of the Klan to downplay its core ideology and effectively frame a recruitment message which resonates with a pre-existing dominant social narrative—a narrative usually based on mythologized history or an unfalsifiable belief system. As will be explained in concluding chapters, the probabilistic model that emerges when these factors combine proves more effective in explaining and predicting campaigns of Klan terrorism than simply listing these factors as if they are not consciously combined for effect. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 292p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 2, 2012 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691628 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691628 Shelf Number: 125447 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismKu Klux Klan (U.S.)Radical GroupsRight Wing Groups |
Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: The Lawless Ones: The Resurgence of the Sovereign Citizen Movement. 2nd edition Summary: The sovereign citizen movement is an extreme anti-government movement whose members believe the government has no authority over them. It began a resurgence of activity, including criminal activity, in 2009 that has shown no signs of stopping. In 2012, the sovereign citizen movement is currently one of the most problematic domestic extremist movements in the United States. Sovereign citizen criminal activity includes violent acts, exemplified recently by the brutal murder of two West Memphis police officers at the hands of a father and son pair of sovereign citizens in May 2010. More violent encounters have occurred between police and sovereign citizens since then. Spontaneous sovereign citizen violence, especially during traffic stops and visits to residences, poses a significant risk to law enforcement officers and public officials. More widespread than violence is a set of tactics known as "paper terrorism," in which sovereign citizens use legal filings to harass, intimidate, and retaliate against public officials, law enforcement officers, and others. Most common is the filing of bogus liens on the property of perceived enemies. Though a number of laws were passed in the 1990s to deal with this problem, sovereign citizens remain undeterred and continue to file such harassing liens in large numbers. Self-appointed "gurus" in the sovereign citizen movement have actively been exploiting the foreclosure crisis, crisscrossing the country promoting schemes and scams to desperate homeowners, while falsely claiming that such schemes can save people's homes. Other sovereign citizens are even brazenly seizing homes left empty because of foreclosures and claiming the homes for their own. As a result of imprisoned sovereign citizens continuing to recruit and teach their ideology while behind bars, a growing number of federal and state prisoners are becoming sovereign citizens or using the "paper terrorism" tactics of the movement to retaliate against judges, prosecutors and others involved in their case. Prison officials have so far had little luck in stemming the growth of this movement in prisons. Though the sovereign citizen movement is still largely white (and contains some white supremacist members), in recent years a growing African- American offshoot of the sovereign citizen movement, often called the "Moorish" movement, has been gaining strength, teaching sovereign citizen ideas and tactics to a new pool of potential recruits. Details: Atlanta, GA: ADL, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2012 at: http://www.adl.org/learn/sovereign_movement/sovereign_citizens_movement_report_2012_edition.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/learn/sovereign_movement/sovereign_citizens_movement_report_2012_edition.pdf Shelf Number: 127019 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismHate Crimes (U.S.)Radical GroupsSovereign Citizen MovementTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management Title: A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border. A Majority Report Summary: The first edition of A Line in the Sand, released in 2006, (hereafter “first edition”) exposed the rising threat of Mexican drug cartels and the vulnerabilities of our porous Southwest border. The horrific violence perpetrated by Mexican drug cartels continues to grow and, in many cases documented in this report, spills into the United States. The cartels now have a presence in more than 1,000 U.S. cities and dominate the wholesale illicit drug trade by controlling the movement of most of the foreign-produced drug supply across the Southwest border. This report documents the increased operational control of the cartels inside the United States, their strategy to move illegal drugs, and the bloody turf wars that have taken place between rival cartels, as they struggle to control valuable trafficking corridors. Collectively, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) maintain firm control of drug and human smuggling routes across the U.S.- Mexico border creating safe entry for anyone willing to pay the price. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in its most recent assessment, asserts it can control only 44 percent of our border with Mexico. Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths into the United States. During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to conduct terror operations. The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a weapon of mass destruction. Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. As this report explains, the United States tightened security at airports and land ports of entry in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down this path of least resistance, and with them the terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to enter. One of the central criticisms made by the 9/11 Commission regarding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was a failure of imagination in piecing together the threat picture from al-Qaeda before it was too late. Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war. Now we are faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations. Similar to the Cuban missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes. The intent of this report is to present that evidence, not to incite anxiety, but rather to reinvigorate vigilance towards our Southwest border and beyond to the threats we face in Latin America. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2012. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 3, 2012 at: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf Shelf Number: 127109 Keywords: Border SecurityDomestic TerrorismDrug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico-U.S)Homeland SecurityRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Bipartisan Policy Center Title: Countering Online Radicalization in America Summary: While being a force for good, the Internet has also come to play an important—and, in many ways, unique—role in radicalizing homegrown and domestic terrorists. Supporters of Al Qaeda, Sovereign Citizens, white supremacists and neo-Nazis, environmental and animal liberationists, and other violent extremist groups all have embraced the Internet with great enthusiasm and vigor. They are using it as a platform to spread their ideas, connect with each other, make new recruits, and incite illegal and violent actions. We believe that this trend will continue and that future terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests will involve individuals who have been radicalized—at least in part—on the Internet. As a result, countering online radicalization should continue to be a major priority for the government and its Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts. The purpose of this report is to equip policy makers with a better understanding of how the Internet facilitates radicalization, in particular within the United States; an appreciation of the dilemmas and trade-offs that are involved in countering online radicalization within the United States; and ideas and best practices for making the emerging approach and strategy richer and more effective. Details: Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2012. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 7, 2012 at: http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/countering-online-radicalization-america Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/countering-online-radicalization-america Shelf Number: 127136 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsInternetRadical Groups (U.S.)Terrorist Groups |
Author: Perliger, Arie Title: Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America’s Violent Far-Right Summary: In the last few years, and especially since 2007, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of attacks and violent plots originating from individuals and groups who self-identify with the far-right of American politics. These incidents cause many to wonder whether these are isolated attacks, an increasing trend, part of increasing societal violence, or attributable to some other condition. To date, however, there has been limited systematic documentation and analysis of incidents of American domestic violence. This study provides a conceptual foundation for understanding different far-right groups and then presents the empirical analysis of violent incidents to identify those perpetrating attacks and their associated trends. Through a comprehensive look at the data, this study addresses three core questions: (1) What are the main current characteristics of the violence produced by the far right? (2) What type of far-right groups are more prone than others to engage in violence? How are characteristics of particular far-right groups correlated with their tendency to engage in violence? (3) What are the social and political factors associated with the level of far-right violence? Are there political or social conditions that foster or discourage violence? It is important to note that this study concentrates on those individuals and groups who have actually perpetuated violence and is not a comprehensive analysis of the political causes with which some far-right extremists identify. While the ability to hold and appropriately articulate diverse political views is an American strength, extremists committing acts of violence in the name of those causes undermine the freedoms that they purport to espouse. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2013. 147p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-violent-far-right Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-violent-far-right Shelf Number: 129588 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsTerrorism (U.S.)Terrorist GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing Summary: This report summarizes the discussions at a seminar organized and hosted by the RAND Corporation at which a group of acting and former senior government and law enforcement officials, practitioners, and experts examined domestic intelligence operations and information sharing as these relate to terrorist threats. The collective experience of the participants spanned the breadth of the homeland security apparatus. The participants included officials who have served or are serving in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DoD), state and local law enforcement agencies, first-responder organizations, and state-level homeland security agencies. A similar group met three years ago to discuss lessons learned from avoiding terrorist attacks at home, the role of DHS's Bureau of Intelligence and Analysis, and the value and focus of fusion centers. One of the goals of the meeting reported here was to measure how much progress was being made (or not made, as the case may be) in several critical areas of homeland security. The seminar was conducted within RAND's continuing program of self-initiated research. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF317/RAND_CF317.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF317/RAND_CF317.pdf Shelf Number: 111284 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismHomeland SecurityIntelligence GatheringTerrorism |
Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada. Feature Focus 2014: Responding to Violent Extremism and Travel Abroad for Terrorism-related Pubposes Summary: Understanding how the global threat environment affects the terrorist threat to Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests enables the Government to counter these threats more effectively. This document, the Government's 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, examines major international and domestic terrorism-related developments during 2013 and early 2014. It highlights two alleged terrorist plots that resulted in arrests in Canada. It also describes several cases where individuals left Canada to participate in terrorism-related activities abroad. These observations draw on consultations with non-government partners, including Canadian community leaders, academics and those in the private sector. In many cases, the 2014 Public Report explains further developments relating to issues discussed in the 2013 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada. The 2014 Public Report also contains a Feature Focus detailing Government actions in 2013 to respond to violent extremism and travel abroad for terrorism-related purposes. The 2014 Public Report represents the combined efforts of several Canadian federal departments and agencies. It fulfills a Government commitment made in the February 2012 document, Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy, to update Canadians on the terrorist threat. In accordance with their individual mandates, many departments and agencies also provide separate updates to Canadians on various aspects of the threat. Details: Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2014. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2015 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 134499 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsTerrorism (Canada)Terrorists |
Author: Edwards, Charlie Title: Out of Reach? The Role of Community Policing in Preventing Terrorism in Canada Summary: When the Kanishka project was being designed in 2010, there was a widespread perception both within Canada and internationally that the country had largely managed to avoid the threat from Al-Qa'ida-inspired terrorism. While there had been one or two isolated cases, these were rare exceptions. Canadian government officials rightly described the threat picture in Canada as 'limited' in comparison with European states and the country's next door neighbour, the US, where attacks directed by Al-Qa'ida had been successful or had reached a mature stage in planning. In contrast, the domestic threat picture in Canada was relatively benign. During the fieldwork phase the authors found this view to be largely still accepted by politicians, law-enforcement practitioners and the public at large. What was interesting to the authors, however, was that this view - influenced by events in Canada and overseas - was changing. A few cases of predominantly Islamist terrorism with links to Canada had appeared over the years. These cases involved, for example, Ahmed Ressam and Momin Khawaja, two individuals with Canadian passports (indeed, Khawaja is Canadian-born). They had connected with elements close to Al-Qaiida and had been involved in planning attacks at the international level, but neither had planned to launch terrorist attacks within Canada itself. A more 'home-grown' threat appeared to emerge in 2006, when Canada's security and intelligence agencies uncovered the so-called 'Toronto 18' cell; their ambitious plans were the first expression of a maturing and purely domestic threat, seeking connections through a network of young radicals across Europe and North America. The plot was successfully disrupted before it reached fruition. Shortly before the publication of this report, the situation changed dramatically as Canada experienced two significant incidents of domestic lone-actor terrorism. On 22 October 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed a soldier at the Canadian National War Memorial in Ottawa; police exchanged fire and eventually shot dead the gunman inside the parliament building. Two days earlier, Martin Couture-Rouleau had deliberately driven a car into a group of Canadian soldiers in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, killing one and injuring others. Both individuals are thought to have been recent converts to Islam who had become radicalised. Prior to these events, the last major attack that had directly involved Canadian citizens with links to the homeland was the bombing on 23 June 1985 of Air India Flight 182 when Sikh extremists killed 329 people - the majority of whom were Canadian citizens flying from Toronto. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201502https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf Shelf Number: 136369 Keywords: Community PolicingDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsRadicalization |
Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2015 Summary: When it came to domestic terrorism and extremism, the year 2015 was a grisly one for the United States. In the past twelve months, the names of a number of American cities became unwelcome shorthand for the carnage that extremist killers wreaked in them: Charleston, Chattanooga, Colorado Springs, San Bernardino. Each of these cities became scenes of tragedy and death, thanks to the cold-hearted ideological motivations of angry killers. It is thus no surprise that these and other domestic extremist killers have collectively amassed a higher number of victims in 2015 than in any previous year since 1995, the year of the Oklahoma City bombing. Preliminary tallies by the Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism indicate that a minimum of 52 people in the United States were killed by adherents of domestic extremist movement in the past 12 months. This number is bound to grow further still, as extremist connections to some murders often take years to be revealed - and there are likely still other murders whose extremist connections may never see the light of day. Still, the 52 people known to have died at the hands of domestic extremists are disturbing enough, more than the numbers killed in 2013 and 2014 put together. The victims included police officers, government workers, service members, and civilians from all walks of life. Key Findings of Report - In 2015, the 52 deaths came at the hands of adherents of four domestic extremist movements: white supremacists, anti-government extremists, domestic Islamic extremists, and anti-abortion extremists. - As has been the case every year since 1995, white supremacists have been responsible for the largest number of deaths, at 20. One incident, the June 17 mass shooting at the Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, which killed nine, was responsible for almost half of these deaths. - Usually, right-wing anti-government extremists account for the next highest number of murders each year, but in 2015, in a disturbing development, domestic Islamic extremists were responsible for 19 deaths, virtually the same as white supremacists. All of these deaths stemmed from two shooting rampages: the July 16 attacks by Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez on military targets in Chattanooga and the December 2 rampage by Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. - The 52 murders occurred in 17 separate incidents, with nine of the incidents involving multiple murders. This is unusual, in that most extremist-related examples of murder involve a single victim. - Ideology played a primary or substantial role in 10 of the 17 incidents in 2015, accounting for 34 of the 52 victims. Non-ideological killings by extremists, which accounted for the remainder, tend to involve group-related killings (such as killing a suspected informant or a rival gang member) or traditional criminal violent activity (in which extremists also often engage). - Overwhelmingly the extremist weapon of choice in 2015 - as in virtually every year - was firearms. In fact, 48 of the 52 victims were killed by firearms. The other four victims were killed by a variety of means, including two stabbings, a blunt instrument killing, and a motor vehicle incident. All of the multiple murder incidents involved the use of one or more firearms. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2015. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2015-web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2015-web.pdf Shelf Number: 137452 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsGun ViolenceHomicidesRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Crime |
Author: Georgetown University, Justice Policy Institute Title: Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism Summary: The United States (US) is the primary target among western states for lone wolf terrorist (LWT) attacks, and the frequency of attacks continues to increase. Even though LWT attacks remain less common and precipitate fewer casualties than terrorist attacks conducted by organizations, the US must continue to focus counterterrorism resources and encourage further research to combat this threat to national security. In this assessment, the Georgetown National Security Critical Issue Task Force (NSCITF) hopes to inform key stakeholders about the most critical lone wolf terrorism issues and spark new policy discussions on how to address the problem. The NSCITF articulates eight findings that inform the collective understanding of lone wolf terrorism and offers three actionable recommendations to address those findings. First, the NSCITF finds that no single USG definition on lone wolf terrorism exists. Second, the NSCITF identifies the following four current trends in domestic LWT attacks, each of which highlight multiple issues that US policymakers must consider when drafting counterterrorism policies directed at LWTs: 1) Increased targeting of law enforcement (LE) and military personnel; 2) Overwhelming use firearms to conduct attacks, compared to LWTs in other western countries who rely on hijackings or bombs; 3) Increased radicalization via the Internet, extremist media, and the civilian workplace; and, 4) Proclamation of an individual ideology instead of claiming affinity to specific, organized extremist groups. Third, despite the presence of overarching trends among domestic LWTs, the NSCITF determines that profiling fails to target potential LWTs effectively. Consequently, in the fourth finding, the NSCITF provides a framework to understand how an individual becomes a LWT and to identify possible intervention points. Fifth, the NSCITF develops a typology that organizes lone wolves in terms of their ideological autonomy and social competence to explicate why lone wolves operate alone, a key gap in the extant literature on terrorism. The final three findings address US federal and local law enforcement policies to prevent LWT attacks. In the sixth finding, the NSCITF identifies the challenges of using traditional law enforcement tactics to identify and stop LWTs. Specifically, the NSCITF highlights how the expansion of the Internet and social media offers individuals an ability to become radicalized without physically interacting with others and research various attack methodologies undetected. The seventh finding demonstrates that aggressive law enforcement tactics - namely, surveillance and monitoring of targeted individuals - risk community mistrust because of perceived infringements on civil liberties and privacy rights. In the final finding, the NSCITF notes that the US lacks a comprehensive, "whole of government" approach that coherently and systematically organizes the federal, local, and state efforts to combat lone wolf terrorism. Based on the above findings, the NSCITF offers three recommendations. First, the USG should adopt a standard definition of lone wolf terrorism. Second, the USG should appoint clear leadership over the problem of lone wolf terrorism to streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels. Finally, the USG should emphasize the prevention and short-circuiting of the radicalization process. Each recommendation will help the USG streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels to prevent future LWT attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Shelf Number: 137881 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityLaw EnforcementLone Wolf TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Stottlemyre, Sonia M. Title: The Effect of Country-Level Income on Domestic Terrorism: A Worldwide Analysis of the Difference between Lone-Wolf and Group Affiliated Domestic Terrorism Summary: Despite vast literature examining causes of terrorism, domestic terrorism has only recently begun to be studied as an entity unto itself. It has long been postulated that a country's wealth influences its domestic terrorism rates but very little research has backed that claim. Preliminary data suggests that there may be important differences between what leads to domestic attacks conducted by terrorist organizations and attacks conducted by people acting alone. The current study hypothesizes that the relationship between a country's wealth, as measured by GDP per capita, and its domestic terrorism rate may be different for lone-wolf terrorism than for group-affiliated terrorism. Results support this hypothesis but not in the expected way; per-capita GDP appears to have a non-linear relationship with lone-wolf terrorism and a linear relationship with group-affiliated terrorism. The data were highly sensitive to changes in model specification so caution must be taken when drawing conclusions based on these findings. Although these results are preliminary, they should encourage future researchers to examine the differences between lone-wolf and group-affiliated domestic terrorism to best understand and prevent both phenomena. Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2014. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed April 8, 2016 at: https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/709882/Stottlemyre_georgetown_0076M_12569.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/709882/Stottlemyre_georgetown_0076M_12569.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138604 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismLone-Wolf Terrorism Poverty Terrorism Wealth |
Author: Williams, Michael J. Title: Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program Summary: This project represents the first ever evaluation of a CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) program in the United States. The evaluation will be conducted in Montgomery County, MD, in collaboration with the community-based, Muslim-led CVE program (The World Organization for Resource Development and Education), the Montgomery County Department of Police, and the Montgomery County Office of Community Partnerships. The first phase of the project will use a multi-method evaluation design to a) understand recruitment and retention practices of participants in a multi-faceted, U.S. community-based, Muslim-led CVE program, b) identify the outcomes of participation in that program, c) assess and explore community knowledge of risk factors associated with radicalization, and individuals' natural inclinations in response to those factors, and d) identify barriers to individual help-seeking and community-law enforcement collaborations in a CVE context. What will emerge from this phase is a set of working theories that clarify the relationships among these four subcomponents and lead to enhanced CVE programming and implementation. The second phase will develop survey instruments designed to measure quantifiably each of the Phase I subcomponents. Additionally, formalized curricula (i.e., educational materials and a manual for law enforcement) will be developed regarding a) awareness of risk factors of radicalization and civic-minded responses to them, and b) training for law enforcement officers regarding ways to build effective collaborations with local Islamic communities. Additionally, the CVE program will adjust its recruitment practices, based on 'lessons learned' from Phase I. The final phase of the project will assess the effectiveness of the CVE programs' adjusted (i.e., Phase II) recruitment practices. Additionally, the CVE programs' outcomes will be tested by comparing participant involvement groups (i.e. those who have never participated vs. participated once vs. participated multiple times). Details: Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2016. 167p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Shelf Number: 139624 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsIslamic ExtremistsMuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: American Civil Liberties Union Title: Unleashed and Unaccountable: The FBI's Unchecked Abuse of Authority Summary: The Federal Bureau of Investigation serves a crucial role in securing the United States from criminals, terrorists, and hostile foreign agents. Just as importantly, the FBI also protects civil rights and civil liberties, ensures honest government, and defends the rule of law. Its agents serve around the country and around the world with a high degree of professionalism and competence, often under difficult and dangerous conditions. But throughout its history, the FBI has also regularly overstepped the law, infringing on Americans' constitutional rights while overzealously pursuing its domestic security mission. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress and successive attorneys general loosened many of the legal and internal controls that a previous generation had placed on the FBI to protect Americans' constitutional rights. As a result, the FBI is repeating mistakes of the past and is again unfairly targeting immigrants, racial and religious minorities, and political dissidents for surveillance, infiltration, investigation, and "disruption strategies." But modern technological innovations have significantly increased the threat to American liberty by giving today's FBI the capability to collect, store, and analyze data about millions of innocent Americans. The excessive secrecy with which it cloaks these domestic intelligence gathering operations has crippled constitutional oversight mechanisms. Courts have been reticent to challenge government secrecy demands and, despite years of debate in Congress regarding the proper scope of domestic surveillance, it took unauthorized leaks by a whistleblower to finally reveal the government's secret interpretations of these laws and the Orwellian scope of its domestic surveillance programs. There is evidence the FBI's increased intelligence collection powers have harmed, rather than aided,its terrorism prevention efforts by overwhelming agents with a flood of irrelevant data and false alarms. Former FBI Director William Webster evaluated the FBI's investigation of Maj. Nadal Hasan prior to the Ft. Hood shooting and cited the "relentless" workload resulting from a "data explosion" within the FBI as an impediment to proper intelligence analysis. And members of Congress questioned several other incidents in which the FBI investigated but failed to interdict individuals who later committed murderous terrorist attacks, including the Boston Marathon bombing. While preventing every possible act of terrorismis an impossible goal, an examination of these cases raise serious questions regardingthe efficacy of FBI methods. FBI data showing that more than half of the violent crimes, including over a third of the murders in the U.S. ,go unsolved each year calls for a broader analysis of the proper distribution of law enforcement resources. With the appointment of Director James Comey, the FBI has seen its first change in leadership sincethe 9/11 attacks, which provides an opportunity for Congress, the president, and the attorney general to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the FBI's policies and programs. This report highlights areas in which the FBI has abused its authority and recommends reforms to ensure the FBI fulfills its law enforcement and security mi ssions with proper public oversight and respect for constitutional rights and democratic ideals. The report describes major changes to law and policy that unleashed the FBI from its traditional restraints and opened the door to abuse. Congress enhanced many of the FBI's surveillance powers after 9/11, primarily through the USA Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments. Therecent revelations regarding the FBI'suse of Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act to track all U.S. telephone calls is only the latest in a long line of abuse. Five Justice Department Inspector General audits documented widespread FBI misuse of Patriot Act authorities in 2007 and 2008. Congress and the American public deserve to know the full scope of the FBI's spying on Americ ans under the Patriot Act and all other surveillance authorities. Details: New York: ACLU, 2013. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 5, 2016 at: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/unleashed-and-unaccountable-fbi-report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/unleashed-and-unaccountable-fbi-report.pdf Shelf Number: 130020 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismFBIFederal Bureau of InvestigationPatriot ActPolice AccountabilityPrivacySurveillance |
Author: Davis, Lois M. Title: Assessment of the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program Summary: The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) created the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program in 1996 to provide counterterrorism training to state, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel. The authors of this report assess the nature and value of the SLATT Program. The authors reviewed the current terrorism threat, both foreign and domestic, to gauge the need for the type of training that SLATT provides; examined how SLATT training is planned and operates; conducted a survey of participants of five SLATT investigative/intelligence workshops and train-the-trainer workshops; and conducted an analysis of the costs and benefits of SLATT to training participants based on results of a choice experiment that was part of the survey to identify what program features participants valued most. The authors conclude with suggestions for improving BJA's SLATT Program. Key Findings Terrorism Threat Assessment Analysis While the United States has not suffered an attack in the past 15 years as catastrophic as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there appears to be no significant abatement of attack attempts or attack planning since 2011. There is an ongoing need to ensure that state and local law enforcement receives training in this area. Assessment of SLATT Workshops A majority of trainees have counterterrorism as a major responsibility of their position. Overall, 6 out of 10 workshop participants indicated that the information provided during the SLATT workshops would change their approach to international terrorist or domestic terrorist threats and/or how they might investigate them. The majority of survey respondents indicated that they had participated in only one or two SLATT trainings in the past five years. Assessment of Costs of SLATT to Law Enforcement Participants SLATT workshops are offered at no cost to law enforcement, though law enforcement agencies incur some modest costs in terms of sending officers to a training and backfilling the positions of those sent, and the agencies that host the SLATT trainings incur some costs in terms of working to plan, market, and support the event. Assessing Features and the Value of SLATT to Participants Across the two types of workshop participants, participants most valued training that was three days in duration and that was less than 100 miles away. Although investigative/intelligence workshop participants preferred a program with both domestic and international terrorist topics, they valued having the training include local examples of the terrorist threat in their region or jurisdiction more than the train-the-trainer workshop participants did. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1276.html Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1276.html Shelf Number: 145313 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Owens, Kimberly B. Title: Beyond hate: countering violent extremism from the white power movement Summary: Counterterrorism efforts are a major focus for the homeland security enterprise. Throughout the world, however, efforts have largely focused on countering violent extremism from Islamist organizations. While Islamist terrorists have been responsible for more deaths in the United States, this research focuses on white power domestic terrorism. It considers successful methods from the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), but applies them to factions of the right-wing movement, rather than Salafi-jihadist groups. This research is a case study comparison of former right-wing leaders, both of whom were associated with planned domestic terror plots. Significantly, the research included participation of individuals formerly active within the politically motivated Ku Klux Klan, and the religiously motivated the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). It revealed a common anti-government theme between the vastly different groups, as well as the sociological underpinnings for participation in the Klan, within the theoretical framework of Social Identity Theory. While extremism is an unpleasant fact, perhaps violence can be mitigated, and having dialogue with those who once carried the torch of white power rhetoric may hold some answers, or provide a starting point for successful counterterrorism efforts. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 146134 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Jensen, Michael Title: Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) Summary: The Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) project uses a mixed-method, nested approach to explore a number of key research questions related to radicalization, including: • what are the demographic, background, and radicalization differences between and within the different ideological milieus? • are there important contextual, personal, ideological, or experiential differences between radicals who commit violent acts and those who do not? • is it possible to identify sufficient pathways to violent extremism? and; • are the causal mechanisms highlighted by extant theories of radicalization supported by empirical evidence? To address these questions, EADR researchers built the largest known database on individual radicalization in the United States: Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS). The database includes 147 variables covering demographic, background, group affiliation, and ideological information for 1,473 violent and non-violent extremists from across the ideological spectrum. The database was analyzed using comparative descriptive statistics and multivariate logistic regression techniques. Additionally, project researchers produced 56 life-course narratives of individuals who radicalized in the U.S., which were analyzed using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA), a methodology that makes it possible to determine the causal conditions and pathways that are most salient for explaining radicalization to violence. EADR produced a number of findings that are relevant for domestic countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, law enforcement, criminal justice policy, and academic research. First, a descriptive comparison of individuals in the PIRUS data shows that with the exception of participation in pre-radicalization criminal activities, many regularly highlighted radicalization warning indicators, such as economic deprivation and low educational attainment, are not more common among extremists than they are for the general population. CVE programs designed to address feelings of relative deprivation may be ineffective in many cases. The results also indicate that it is important to consider age and gender when designing prevention and intervention programs as a part of domestic CVE efforts. Programs designed for juveniles and men may be ineffective for preventing radicalization among older individuals, who are especially prevalent among the far right and single-issue milieus, and women, who are found in large numbers on the far left. In addition to addressing issues of age and gender, intervention programs should look to take advantage of the comparatively long radicalization durations that exist across the ideological spectrum, which often last several months or years, and they should target the face-to-face and virtual social networks that mobilize lone and group-based extremists to act. Second, through a set of robust statistical models, the project identified a number of factors that indicate which extremists are most likely to engage in violent acts. All other things held constant, pre-radicalization criminal activity and post-radicalization clique membership are strongly associated with violent outcomes among radicalized individuals. To the extent that law-enforcement agencies and CVE programs prioritize potentially violent individuals over others when resources are constrained, this finding suggests that their focus should be placed on individuals with prior interactions with the criminal justice system and those who are known to associate with others holding extreme views. Other factors uncovered by this analysis suggest that individuals on the far right and those motivated by Salafi jihadist ideologies are more likely to engage in violence, while those with stable employment histories and those motivated by animal rights and environmental concerns are significantly less likely to do so. Lastly, EADR reveals that psychological, emotional, material, and group-based factors can combine in complex ways to produce many pathways to violent extremism. Social and behavioral indicators of radicalization are embedded in complex processes that unfold in non-linear ways. Using fs/QCA techniques, the project reveals that both a sense of community victimization and a radical shift in individuals’ cognitive frames are necessary conditions for radicalization to violent extremism. These necessary conditions combine with a host of other factors to produce eight sufficient pathways to violent extremism. Of these, the majority are driven by psychological and emotional vulnerabilities that stem from lost significance, personal trauma, and collective crises. These findings suggest that successful CVE programs and counter-narratives need to address feelings of community victimization in ways that challenge myths and misperceptions, but also acknowledge legitimate grievances. Programs that place an undue focus on particular communities are likely to be counterproductive by exasperating feelings of collective victimization. Successful programs, on the other hand, will be tailored to specific ideological groups and sub-groups, and will address the underlying psychological and emotional vulnerabilities that make individuals open to extremist narratives. The results of the EADR project lend good support to radicalization mechanisms that are based on personal and collective psychology. That said, our analysis failed to account for the radicalization pathways of 15 of 35 cases of violent extremism that were analyzed, which indicates that extant radicalization research does not account for all of the causal conditions that can contribute to radicalization processes. Future research efforts should focus on interviews with extremists and panel surveys of at-risk populations in order to identify these missing conditions. Doing so will also allow researchers to more closely chart how attitudinal and behavioral traits change over-time. The results of these efforts should be used to inform domestic CVE efforts, especially when it comes to program design and evaluation. CVE programs are only likely to succeed if they reflect an empirical understanding of the myriad causes of radicalization and its consequences. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_NIJ_EmpiricalAssessmentofDomesticRadicalizationFinalReport_Dec2016_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_NIJ_EmpiricalAssessmentofDomesticRadicalizationFinalReport_Dec2016_0.pdf Shelf Number: 145380 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Dooley, Daniel A. Title: Stemming the growth: exploring the risk factors in group membership in domestic street gangs and foreign terrorist organizations Summary: Despite law enforcement's best efforts, terrorist groups are expanding at alarming rates. One of the easiest ways to prevent terrorist attacks is to prevent individuals from joining terrorist organizations. Counter-terrorism programs that effectively reduce membership, reduce association and increase desistance to terror groups will undoubtedly reduce terror incidents. This research identifies risk factors that greatly influence an individual's decision to join a terrorist group; policy makers can use this information to design new policies aimed at prevention and intervention. If the U.S. government is looking for community-oriented solutions to criminal groups, it need look no further than the study of domestic street gangs. There is vast research into theories, strategies and programs that policy makers can reference. Because these models already exist for street gangs, the government need not waste time developing new strategies from scratch. This research discovered the group dynamic and processes that exist for street gangs exits similarly for terrorist organizations. It is the hope that this research lends new direction to the developing policies and de-radicalization strategies that are currently underway. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2017. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 25, 2017 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47251/15Sep_Dooley_Daniel.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47251/15Sep_Dooley_Daniel.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 146893 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismGangs Poverty Radicalization Terrorists Youth Gangs |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Domestic Terrorism: An Overview Summary: The emphasis of counterterrorism policy in the United States since Al Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been on jihadist terrorism. However, in the last decade, domestic terrorists - people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements - have killed American citizens and damaged property across the country. Not all of these criminals have been prosecuted under federal terrorism statutes, which does not imply that domestic terrorists are taken any less seriously than other terrorists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially designate domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist "threats." These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion. The boundary between constitutionally protected legitimate protest and domestic terrorist activity has received public attention. This boundary is highlighted by a number of criminal cases involving supporters of animal rights - one area in which specific legislation related to domestic terrorism has been crafted. The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (P.L. 109-374) expands the federal government's legal authority to combat animal rights extremists who engage in criminal activity. Signed into law in November 2006, it amended the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-346). This report is intended as a primer on the issue, and four discussion topics in it may help explain domestic terrorism's relevance for policymakers: - Level of Activity. Domestic terrorists have been responsible for orchestrating numerous incidents since 9/11. - Use of Nontraditional Tactics. A large number of domestic terrorists do not necessarily use tactics such as suicide bombings or airplane hijackings. They have been known to engage in activities such as vandalism, trespassing, and tax fraud, for example. - Exploitation of the Internet. Domestic terrorists - much like their jihadist analogues - are often Internet and social-media savvy and use such platforms to share ideas and as resources for their operations. - Decentralized Nature of the Threat. Many domestic terrorists rely on the concept of leaderless resistance. This involves two levels of activity. On an operational level, militant, underground, ideologically motivated cells or individuals engage in illegal activity without any participation in or direction from an organization that maintains traditional leadership positions and membership rosters. On another level, the above-ground public face (the "political wing") of a domestic terrorist movement may focus on propaganda and the dissemination of ideology - engaging in protected speech. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44921: Accessed September 15, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf Shelf Number: 147336 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2016 Summary: ONE WORD LOOMS OVER THE LANDSCAPE of deadly extremism and terrorism in the United States in 2016: Orlando. The June 2016 shooting spree at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, by Omar Mateen - who killed 49 people and wounded 53 more - dwarfed in its lethality all other extremist-related murders this past year. Mateen, who claimed his attack in the name of ISIS, though there are no known connections between him and that terror organization, achieved the dubious distinction of being the deadliest domestic terrorist since Timothy McVeigh bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. Last year, the Anti-Defamation League reported that, in 2015, domestic extremists had killed more people than in any previous year since 1995. Largely because of Mateen's attack, 2016 now supplants 2015 in its deadly toll. ADL's preliminary tally of extremist-related deaths at the end of 2015 was 52. However, information that has emerged since then has now brought the 2015 total to 65 deaths at the hands of extremists, as it can sometimes take months or years for an extremist connection to a death to come to light. ADL's preliminary tally for 2016 is already at 69, a figure that includes the 49 killed by Mateen as well as 20 other murders committed by white supremacists, anti-government extremists such as sovereign citizens, and black nationalists. This grisly toll puts 2016 as the second deadliest year for domestic extremist-related deaths in the United States since 1970, the earliest year for which ADL maintains such statistics. The number will inevitably grow higher still as more 2016 murders turn out to have extremist ties. Were it not for the Orlando shootings, 2016 might have been considered a "mild" year for extremist-related deaths. Including Orlando, there were only 11 lethal incidents in the U.S. in 2016 that can be connected to extremism, compared to 29 incidents in 2015. Moreover, the number of incidents involving multiple fatalities in 2016 was only five, half the number of such incidents in 2015. Leaving out the Orlando shootings, one would have to go back all the way to 2006 to find a number of people killed by extremists smaller than that in 2016. The Pulse massacre was a single event so egregious in its casualty tolls that it can actually distort statistics and perceptions surrounding the extremist landscape. It is important to note that the number of Americans killed by domestic extremists is small compared to the total number of murders in the United States or even the number of those who die from gun violence each year. But these deaths represent merely the tip of a pyramid of extremist violence and crime in this country. For every person killed at the hands of an extremist, many more are wounded or injured in attempted murders and assaults. Every year, police uncover and prevent a wide variety of extremist plots and conspiracies with lethal intentions. And extremists engage in a wide variety of other crimes related to their causes, from threats and harassment to white collar crime. To give just one other measure of extremist violence as an example, for the five years from 2012-2016, at least 56 shooting incidents between police and domestic extremists occurred (the vast majority of them shootouts or incidents in which extremists shot at police). During these encounters, extremists shot 69 police officers, 18 fatally. Additionally, compared to many other types of violence, extremist-related violence has the power to shock or spread fear within an entire community - or an entire nation - as the Orlando shootings so tragically demonstrated this past year. The enormity of the attack in Orlando shocked and frightened all Americans, but it was a particular blow to the LGBT community in the United States, as the Pulse nightclub was a gay bar and dance club and most of the victims were gay, lesbian, or transgender. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2017. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2017 at: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/MurderAndExtremismInUS2016.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/MurderAndExtremismInUS2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147425 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismExtremistExtremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceHomicidesTerrorismWhite Supremacists |
Author: St. George, Sarah Title: Assessing the Vulnerability in Targets of Lethal Domestic Extremism Summary: Domestic terrorism is a significant issue of concern and in recent years there has been a notable rise in deadly attacks committed by extremists. Extensive government resources have been allocated to prevent domestic terrorist attacks and to harden vulnerable targets. Scholars have conducted numerous studies on domestic terrorism and target selection. However, very little is known about target vulnerability and more specifically about the relationship between target vulnerability, victims and lethality. This dissertation fills this gap and examines the victims of lethal domestic extremist attacks and the situational context that surrounds these incidents. Eight separate measures of vulnerability are examined that are derived from Clarke and Newman (2006)'s EVIL DONE framework. This dissertation expands this framework by applying the framework to human targets and considering the victim and the situational context the victim was in at the time of the attack. The ideological motivation for each attack is examined to determine if there are differences in vulnerability based on motive (ideologically motivated homicides vs. non-ideologically motivated homicides) as well as the ideology of the suspect (right-wing vs. jihadist). Several factors relating to the victim and suspect are also examined. This project utilizes the Extremist Crimes Database (ECDB) and examines lethal incidents of domestic extremism that occurred between 1990-2014. This research makes several important contributions by filling a gap in terrorism literature and helps policymakers with target prioritization. Details: East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 2017. 189p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed January 18, 2018 at: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1949665158?pq-origsite=gscholar Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1949665158?pq-origsite=gscholar Shelf Number: 148869 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceHomicidesTerrorism |
Author: Jackson, Brian A. Title: Practical Terrorism Prevention: Reexamining U.S. National Approaches to Addressing the Threat of Ideologically Motivated Violence Summary: Terrorism prevention - superseding the programs and activities previously known as countering violent extremism (CVE) - policies seek to broaden the options available to address the risk of individual radicalization and mobilization to ideologically driven violence. These programs provide alternatives to arrest, prosecution, and incarceration by countering recruiting or radicalizing messages, intervening before individuals have committed serious crimes, or supporting the reentry and desistance from violence of individuals convicted and incarcerated for terrorism-related offenses. Government involvement in these programs has been controversial, due to concerns about such efforts' potential to infringe on Constitutionally protected rights and the risk of outreach or intervention activities stigmatizing communities by associating them with terrorism or extremism. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Office of Policy requested that the Homeland Security and Operational Analysis Center examine past U.S. CVE and current terrorism prevention efforts, evaluate the DHS and interagency posture for federal efforts, and explore policy options to strengthen terrorism prevention going forward. Researchers found that current terrorism prevention capabilities are relatively limited. Most initiatives are implemented locally or outside government, and only a subset receive federal support. Among interviewees in law enforcement, government, and some community organizations, there is a perceived need for a variety of federal efforts to help strengthen and broaden local and nongovernmental capacity. However, doing so will be challenging, since concerns about past counterterrorism and CVE efforts have significantly damaged trust in some communities. As a result, terrorism prevention policy and programs will need to focus on building trust locally, and designing programs and federal activities to maintain that trust over time. Key Findings -- Current terrorism prevention efforts are limited Limited programmatic focus and resource investment since 2014, coupled with sustained opposition that focused on limiting CVE efforts, have constrained efforts to develop approaches to individuals at risk of ideological violence other than arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. Reinvestment in federal field staff is key Personnel who are based locally but who are aware of the federal picture could help to build relationships, strengthen trust, and act as on-the-ground facilitators of local terrorism prevention efforts. This could both deliver immediate results and help to build for the longer term. Interviewees identified specific needs in the areas of awareness and training, federal support, federal program development, and research and evaluation Objective threat information is needed by technology companies to guide their efforts in the online space. Improved risk-assessment tools also would be useful to manage programming for individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Sharing best practices and knowledge was viewed as important, and interviewees noted the value of bringing together researchers, implementers, and others to share information. Federal action to facilitate local programs and capability-building should be the priority across multiple components of terrorism prevention. A more robust and interdisciplinary research community is needed for terrorism prevention, and, although efforts in the past regarding CVE were useful and should be continued, they are not enough. Recommendations For countermessaging and intervention programming, the federal government should focus on funding and assisting state, local, and nongovernmental organizations and private actors rather than building capabilities itself. The federal government should continue to provide community awareness briefings and training exercises to local groups. These activities were viewed by interviewees as successful in disseminating needed information. Recent reductions in staffing have limited federal capacity to do so. Adapting existing tools like table-top exercises to help empower local areas to explore the types of terrorism prevention that are appropriate for their circumstances appeared to be promising. Openness and transparency in training delivery would help to support trust in a controversial area, and using unclassified and open source information that can be shared broadly is more practical for efforts that must bridge many organizational boundaries. Pursuing public-private partnerships and broadening support from nonsecurity agencies would be a practical approach to supporting terrorism prevention efforts in a way that is potentially more acceptable to communities and members of the public. Building and maintaining the bench of expert practitioners will be important in developing programs from the national to the local levels. Strengthening investment in evaluation would address criticism of the effectiveness of both past CVE and current terrorism prevention efforts in the future. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019. 335p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2019 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2647.html Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2647.html Shelf Number: 155851 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremismRadicalizationTerrorism PreventionTerrorism Risk Assessment |